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Chapter 1:
Taiwan’s Semiconductor Success: State and Network-led Development

Taiwan is an island nation with a population less than Shanghai, but the island’s largest
semiconductor firms, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and United
Microelectronics (UMC), maintain more than half of the world’s semiconductor foundry market
share.1 Taiwan’s emerging economy is perhaps more distinguished than prominent late-comer
neighbors such as Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, because it is the only economy to not only
catch-up within a high tech industry such as semiconductors, but also produce at the cutting edge
of industry innovation. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry success is well matched with the life
and career of recently retired TSMC Chairman and CEO Morris Chang. Mr. Chang was one of
Taiwan’s first generation of engineers studying in the United States, where he earned degrees in
Mechanical Engineering from M.I.T, as well as a PhD in electrical engineering from Stanford
University. He spent the majority of his early career working for Texas Instruments as a senior
1

Clair Brown and Greg Linden, “Crisis 2: Rising Cost of Fabrication.” in Chips and Change : How Crisis Reshapes
the Semiconductor Industry, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 39.
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Vice President overseeing semiconductor production. After years of attaining and absorbing
knowledge, business practices and know-how, in 1985 Chang shifted his attention homeward by
serving as the Chairman for Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute. TSMC was
officially created in 1987 as a joint venture between the Taiwan government (ITRI), the Dutch
multinational corporation (MNC) Phillips, as well as private investors, with Chang leaving ITRI
to lead the new venture. Chang claims the establishment of TSMC “ushered in a new era in the
electronics industry-that of the dedicated silicon foundry.” 2
While Chang’s inception of the foundry-fabless organization of the semiconductor supply
chain indeed manifested into a reality, one should also consider political and economic structural
factors supporting the establishment of TSMC and the foundry-fabless style of production.
Certainly, the fragmentation of global production and business trends like outsourcing and the
vertical disintegration of industries helped Taiwan’s foundry sector success. Additionally,
scholars like Anna Lee Saxenian suggest the connections and know-how Chang and other
returnee entrepreneurs attained abroad (Network-led), is more important for Taiwan’s
semiconductor success than the industrial and State policy of Taiwan (State-led). Which factor is
more important for Taiwan achieving and maintaining the technological cutting edge in
semiconductor fabrication, and did this dramatic change in organized production influence the
State’s ability to impact development decisions? In other words, how is Taiwan’s ability to direct
development impacted by the vertical disintegration of the global semiconductor industry, and
where is the center of development decision making power located?

2

M Chang, “Foundry Future: Challenges in the 21st Century,” 2007 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits
Conference. Digest of Technical Papers, San Francisco, CA, pp. 18-23.
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Literature Review
To most scholars, explanations for high-tech development in late emerging economies are
either founded in an emphasis on State-led policy initiatives and infrastructure providing private
enterprises the necessary inputs for innovation, or a focus on transnational networks of industry
links, as well as the influx of a market economy attempting to find the correct market prices.
Within the context of Taiwan, political economist Dan Breznitz argues the ‘Innovation State’
primarily deserves credit for the successful semiconductor foundry sector in Taiwan due to initial
research development initiatives of public research consortia, such as ITRI and Electronic
Research Service Organization (ERSO), creating spin-off companies like United
Microelectronics (UMC) and TSMC, as well as initially attaining foreign technology for IC
fabrication from firms like RCA. While Breznitz largely credits the Taiwanese government for
the initial development of the nation’s semiconductor industry, significantly he adds that
continued development is in part due to the State’s willingness and ability to give up
development decisions once a relatively strong private sector semiconductor foundry industry
emerged.3 In other words, he claims the Taiwanese State focused on aiding and upgrading
domestic firm development and capabilities, specifically the physical manufacturing of
semiconductor chips, in order for these firms to attain the technological level and leverage
needed for firm to firm interactions when entering the global semiconductor industry. Breznitz
credits State policy for actively targeting these MNC’s and points to policies such as the

3

Dan Breznitz, “The Development of the IT Industry in Taiwan: Public Research Institutions as Growth Impetus?”
in Innovation and the State: Political Choice and Strategies for Growth in Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland (New Haven;
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 99.
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establishment of the world’s first export-processing-zone and favorable tax incentives initially
attracting top foreign firms, such as Dutch MNC Phillips, to Taiwan. These policies undoubtedly
incentivized firms to move production to Taiwan, but without strong domestic firm capabilities
there is no incentive for firms to move focus away from relative low labor costs assembly and
testing stages of production. The most important factors in Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor
development is not favorable tax policies or low environmental standards, but instead are
domestic firms ability to transition from low-end tech activity to achieving the global
technological cutting edge.

State Driven Theories of Development
In the following section, we will analyze the arguments of prominent Statist literatures as
well as State-driven development arguments tailored specifically for Taiwan’s high-tech
industries. In an attempt to provide nuanced understandings and complex analysis of Breznitz’
and other claims, we will address their claims with no abstention of prominent criticisms. We
will compare Breznitz’ arguments with alternative theories for high-tech development, like
Saxenian’s network led theory, and find if they are in contradiction and or agreement with each
other.
Breznitz’s theoretical framework largely stems from and is supported by literature of the
developmental state. Stephen Haggard in his book Developmental States looks at the relationship
between intervention and growth in developing economies. Statist literature, including
Haggard’s, claims state action can overcome weak areas of either market failure, technology
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transfer, adoption and learning. The positive relationship Haggard claims to exist offers
theoretical evidence to explain the practical success of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and
supports Breznitz’ argument “the state (Taiwan) itself, acting as the technology-creating agent,
has spurred the growth of the IT sector… by embedding public research institutions within the
technology-creating sector.”4 ITRI is the most successful of these public research institutes and
served a variety of functions for developing Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. For example, ITRI
facilitated technical cooperation with domestic private enterprises for development of key
technologies, as well as training highly qualified personal, expanding research links with
institutions abroad and maintaining close relations between various universities and R&D
organizations within Taiwan.5 While the Taiwanese State directed these public research institutes
to train a high-skilled workforce and other initiatives, the relative success of the personal and
firms they create cannot solely be attributed to Taiwan's government policy. One must take a
closer look at the national, educational and professional backgrounds of the individual actors and
their personal networks before offering conclusions regarding the impact of State directives.
Additionally, Breznitz credits state attention towards building a local supplier network of
firms for MNC’s as a major reason for Taiwan’s successful assimilation into the larger global IT
ecosystem.6 In other words, Breznitz gives credit to the State for encouraging firms to carve
specialized niches in the IT and semiconductor supply chain, and integrating themselves into
global supply chains. While true Taiwan developed a significant local supplier network for both
domestic and foreign firms, did this development occur due to specific State policy actions, or
4

Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 98.

5

Walter Arnold, “Science and Technology Development in Taiwan and South Korea,” Asian Survey (1988): 447.
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Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 100.
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did individual firms and personal's recognition of industry trends, like vertical disintegration of
production, spawn the influx of specialized component producers? While Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry had a large local supplier network, Breznitz’ claim overlooks the
potential relevance of individual engineers, CEOs, and founders of the large local supplier
network developing both local and global industry networks for knowledge transfer, thereby
spurring innovation.
Breznitz claims Taiwan’s public research institutes helped to form the strategy of basing
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry off achieving capabilities to modularly produce chips—instead
of focusing on more capital-intensive memory chip markets, which at the time faced intense
competition from high tech-giants; the U.S, Japan, and Korea.7 Significantly, Breznitz mentions
that these policy decisions are largely influenced by American advisors with the United States
Department for International Aid (USAID). These advisors recognized global business trends of
outsourcing and de-verticalization of organized production, which globalization catalyzed, and
sought to create an industry in Taiwan to complement these global trends, while at the same time
providing massive benefits for entrenched firms of advanced industrial nations, like the United
States. Breznitz also claims the result of these initial policy directives, and other State provided
inputs, like physical infrastructure, initial capital investments and education, led to the early
success of State spinoff UMC as well as later leading to ERSO privatizing the construction of a
“VLSI fabrication facility employing an innovative business model—the pureplay foundry.”8
Breznitz also points to successful semiconductor foundry firms—Vanguard and Winbond, who

7

Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 109.

8

Ibid., 110.
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were spin-offs of public domain projects—as additional evidence to support his claim of the
State's central role in developing the industry.9
A criticism of Breznitz and others' claims of the central role of the State in Taiwan’s hightech semiconductor development is the literature of absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity is
defined as a firms ability to absorb knowledge and produce innovative products with ideas
accessed through shared knowledge pools.10 Political-economist Anthony Howell argues that
high levels of state intervention has a negative relationship with domestic firms absorptive
capacity.11 Howell continues by claiming specifically State-led and top-down policy initiatives
tend to result in issues of group-think; causing inefficient repetition of ideas and reducing
outside-the-box and risk taking behavior that typically characterizes innovative activity.12
Perhaps this criticism of Breznitz’ argument suggests his emphasis on the State transitioning its
role from active leader, to a decentralized supportive role, is a response to Howell and others
points around absorptive capacity. Additionally, the well-documented cases of developmental
state economies in Korea and Japan provide counter-evidence that high levels of State
involvement in economic development decisions reduce innovation and successful high-tech
catching up.13
Douglas Fuller in his article “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s impact on
Development in Taiwan and China: Adversaries and Partners” explores the dynamic and
9

Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 110.
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Cohen and Levinthal, 1990.

11 Anthony

Howell, “Relatedness economies, absorptive capacity, and economic catch-up: firmlevel evidence from
China,” Industrial and Corporate Change (2019): 3.
12Anthony

Howell, “Relatedness economies, absorptive capacity, and economic catch-up: firmlevel evidence from
China,” Industrial and Corporate Change (2019): 4.
13

Daedrick and Kraemer (2002).
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changing cross-strait economic relationship—with a specific focus on the impact to Taiwan’s
electronics sector including semiconductors. Fuller largely concurs with Breznitz that State
policy facilitated the acquisition of necessary inputs for the inception and initial ‘start-up’ phase
of the industry.14 However, significantly he states “although the Taiwanese State originally
created both TSMC and UMC, the continued competitiveness of its semiconductor fabrication
has had little to do with government policy beyond preferential tax treatment.”15 Fuller points to
other forward looking State-policy methods, like the recruitment of MNC R&D centers to
Taiwan, as one factor helping Taiwan maintain a competitive advantage in high-tech
manufacturing.16 Additionally, similar to Breznitz, Fuller credits entrenched and efficient
communicative links between Taiwanese local suppliers and leading domestic firms. These
industry networks represent significant barriers to entry for late-coming firms in other emerging
economies without access to Taiwan’s diverse local component supplier network, like China.
Despite Fuller crediting the importance of industry connections, Fuller continues by largely
crediting Breznitz’ theory of ITRI model of technological upgrading within the semiconductor
industry, as well as other successful Taiwanese tech industries, like automotive.

Network Driven Development in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry

14

Douglas, Fuller, “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship's Impact on Development,” in Taiwan and China:
Adversaries and Partners, Asian Survey 48 (2008), 252.
15Ibid.,
16

252.

Ibid., 255.
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In the following section, we will discuss and analyze the arguments for a network-driven
model of success stemming from the personal and professional networks of Taiwan’s returnee
entrepreneurs. Additionally, we will discuss technical factors contributing to the disintegration of
vertical production and the creation of the fabless/fab model of semiconductor production. We
will attempt to engage in a dialogue between State-driven and network driven arguments to
understand whether or not the arguments are ultimately in contradiction with each-other.
Anna Lee Saxenian’s book The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global
Economy shifts away from an analytical focus on the role of the state, large corporations and
domestic firms integration, replaced with analysis of global production networks for evaluating
Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor industry growth.17 While she recognizes State factors as
supporting actors for high-tech development, her central claim is “entrepreneurs and their farflung networks now play a vital role in the technology industries’ global expansion—and make
an increasingly important contribution to economic growth and development more broadly.”18 In
the case of Taiwan, Saxenian claims while the public sector has played a role in the governance
of the industrial system, “Taiwan’s policymakers do not direct this process of technological and
industrial upgrading, and institutions like ITRI and ERSO have limited control over the pace and
direction of innovation in domestic industry.” 19 Instead, Saxenian argues that ethnic Chinese
U.S.- based engineers—due to shared bonds of cultural background, a diverse web of
professional networks in cross-regional and local industry networks, as well as various public

17 Anna

Lee Saxenian, “Taiwan as Silicon Sibling,” in The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global
Economy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 130
18 Anna
19

Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 100.

Ibid., 132.
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and private sector advisory committees and business associations assisting in networking events
—facilitate the rapid diffusion of business and technical knowledge inputs necessary for
producing at the innovative edge. In other words, by accessing accumulated industry knowledge
sources, key individuals and expertise—such as the advantage of specialization in a volatile and
technological uncertain environment— Taiwan positioned the domestic semiconductor industry
for rapid success. 20 While Breznitz mentions the influence of “American advisors” when
guiding ERSOs development decisions for the privatization of VLSI technology, he mainly
focuses on the fact the decision comes from within the public sector. He does not offer a complex
account of key actors backgrounds and connections within public sector institutions, which
Saxenian suggests come closer to identifying the source for the dynamic shift in organized
industrial production occurring in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.
Clair Brown and Greg Linden, in their book Chips and Change: How Crisis Reshapes the
Semiconductor Industry, offer an alternative perspective to Taiwan’s semiconductor success.
Their analytical approach is based on the technical factors that lead to the industry wide reorganization of production, i.e. vertical disintegration. The authors discuss two main technical
innovations that allowed for the breaking off between design and manufacturing: the digitization
and transmission of design—perfected during early 1980s specifically with the Berekely
Transistor Simulation Model (BSIM) —which allowed for design (fabless) firms to effectively
transmit their chip designs to foundry firms located on the other side of the Pacific— as well as
the solidification of the Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) process as the mainstream method
of fabrication technology, which created a “predictable technology trajectory for designers to

20

Ibid., 133.
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target.”21 As a result of these technical innovations, it became profitable for vertically integrated
firms to begin outsourcing more capital intensive stages of production, like physical fabrication,
to the emerging semiconductor foundry sector. Additionally, advanced fabless design firms no
longer feared outsourcing their innovative chip designs to the foundry firms due to foundry firms
inability to take the designs and develop their own chip designs based off their customers. In
other words, the de-verticalizaiton of industry reduced intellectual property disputes for fabless
designers as they were no longer forced to turn to their competitors (large integrated IC firms)
for the fabrication of their chip. When focusing our analysis, we must look closely at whether
Taiwan’s pureplay-foundry sector grew out of these technical innovations, or grew in
anticipation of them.
Brown and Linden also discuss important characteristics of the semiconductor industry
such as the level of the semiconductor industry’s interconnectedness, even between different
aspects of technological development. While semiconductor fabrication is itself an industry,
pureplay-foundry firms heavily rely on separate technological advancement such as advancing
lithographic capabilities. In fact, 20% of the cost to produce a cutting edge foundry is the price of
lithography tools and equipment for fabrication. 22 This dynamic highlights the importance of
developing cross-industry connections to different aspects of the supply and value chain, which
also supports Saxenian’s network-model approach for development.
Sue Ching Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen in their journal article “Keeping the high-tech
region open and dynamic: the organizational networks of Taiwan’s integrated circuit industry”

21

Clair Brown and Greg Linden, Chips and Change, 47.

22

Clair Brown and Greg Linden, Chips and Change, 40.
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explore the relevance of both domestic and external industry links that provide “channels for
companies to gain market information, customers, technology, and capital.”23 The authors
gathered empirical evidence by collecting data on the top 32 IC firms in the Hsinchu Science and
Industry Park region and identifying key actions taken by these firms that had an impact on
organizational development.24 These “organizational events” occur both intra-firm, inter-firm and
firm to external groups like trade associations. This paper adds a layer of support for Saxenian’s
argument on the central importance of network-led development. Significantly, the number of
organizational connections increased rapidly during the late 80s and 90s, when private firms
began to lead the semiconductor industry. Although this paper specifically mentions the
important role ITRI and ERSO held during the early
stages of semiconductor development, the number of
events dramatically increased when these organizations
were no longer as relevant. Additionally, this paper
highlights the importance of having both regional and
global cross-industry connections as over 50% of these
‘organizational events’ occurred within Taiwan. The
concentration of events in the U.S.A is notable because
it supports Saxenian's claim that specifically U.S. based
ethnically Chinese engineers play a prominent role in
the diffusion of knowledge to Taiwanese industry.

Jou, Sue-Ching, and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region
Open and Dynamic: the Organizational Networks of Taiwan's Integrated

23

Sue-Ching, Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region Open and Dynamic: the Organizational
Networks of Taiwan's Integrated Circuit Industry,” GeoJournal 53, (2001): 81.
24

Sue-Ching, Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region Open and Dynamic: (2001): 82.
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Breznitz may disagree with Saxenian’s emphasis on individual entrepreneurs and their
professional networks primarily contributing to the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry because how can a network-centered approach explain the different development
trajectories of Taiwan’s hardware and software industries, which he claims is due to differences
in the bureaucratic structures of public research consortia like ITRI and the Institution for
Information Industry. Breznitz claims III’s agendas—to promote Taiwan’s software industry
while also generating enough revenue to cover its own expenses—proved to be in conflict, with
the end result that III has been competing directly with (Taiwan’s) private software firms.25
Additionally, he suggests “because III had captured the big governmental contracts, and the big
global IT industries were competing directly on big projects, the industry was unable to develop
big software houses specializing in customized development.”26 In response, Saxenian may
suggest that by encouraging III to reach profitability, while also giving the institution generous
government contracts and other benefits, the government policy aims to create a “national
champion" rather than the “natural champion" approach seen in the semiconductor industry.
Additionally, Saxenian may also suggest the issue is not a result of state policy creating
conflicting agendas within a public research consortia, but instead is a failure to catalyze crossregional connections. Owing to III's setting an industry direction to directly compete with top
foreign software firms, this disincentives foreign firms to contract out higher value added
activities with sensitive intellectual property information. If firms are attempting to directly
compete, rather than complement, the existing software industry within advanced industrial

25

Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 131.

26

Ibid., 131.
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economies, then it is likely to create a cooling effect on Taiwan’s domestic industry cooperation
with foreign firms. In other words, while good state policy can aid indigenous development of
high-tech innovation, poor state policy derails indigenous development by interrupting the
mutual positive feedback loop associated with carving a niche in the global division of labor,
which results from connecting innovative and global leading firms with complementary
secondary innovators. Due to less global industry interaction with Taiwan's domestic firms,
Saxenian may suggest her brain circulating cross-regional networks are put on freeze due to
intense local and global competition.
Breznitz is not alone in placing the central credit for Taiwan’s semiconductor success in
the hands of State technocrats. In Mathew's and Cho’s article “ A Silicon Valley of the East” and
again in their book “Tiger Technologies” in terms of successful high-tech development, they
largely credits Taiwan’s technocrat in chief Premier Y. S. Sun and his recruiting efforts in the 70s
of ethnic Chinese engineers in leading positions within U.S firms to make up the personal of the
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), as well as later on the Science and Technology Advisory
Group (STAG). He claims the TAC framed recommendations for starting a new semiconductor
industry within Taiwan, under the auspices of ITRI, which lead to the creation of ERSO and that
organizations agenda for developing “the technological capabilities needed to generate a
semiconductor industry.” 27 Cho and Mathews continue by claiming ERSO’s technological
development and initial public sector capital expenditures led to successful technological
upgrading, and eventual knowledge diffusion, into the local private industry.28 He specifically
27

Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, “A Cat Can Look at a King: How Taiwan Did it,” in Tiger Technologies: The
Creation of a Semiconductor Industry in East Asia, ed. John Ravenhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
159.
28

Ibid., 164.

Farley 1! 6
credits the TAC's recommendation for developing CMOS technology for fabrication as “a farsighted decision given its subsequent significance as dominant semiconductor manufacturing
technology. 29 Significantly, they mention that ERSO was unable to secure a foreign MNC for the
initial technology acquisition of fabrication technology until “under the influence of Dr. Pan,
then working for the US electronics firm RCA, ERSO was successful in signing a technology
transfer agreement with RCA.”30 While Mathews and Cho seem to give credit to Dr. Pan, he
does not open his analytical approach to account for the significance of Dr. Pan’s professional
connections to RCA and the global semiconductor industry in regards to ERSO’s initial
technology acquisition. Saxenian may suggest without key individuals private networks, it's
difficult to determine whether any of ERSO’s acquisition initiatives would have left initial
planning.
Mathews and Cho credit STAG as well as the National Science Council (NSC)
specifically for recommending the creation of the Hsinchu Science Park, which has historically
played the role of intra-industry and inter-firm connector, as well as continues today to house
Taiwan’s most advanced semiconductor and IC firms. Funding for the HSP was largely State
provided, and soon after completion pubic consortia, like ERSO and ITRI, located their
development initiatives in the park. Significantly, Cho fails to mention that all 15 of STAG were
recruited from the United States, where technology based clusters like Silicon Valley were
already the predominant and preferred method of industrial spatial-organization.31 Essentially,
Saxenian suggests that although these important policy decisions facilitated key developments in
29

Ibid., 164.

30

Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, Tiger Technologies, 165.
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the upgrading of Taiwan's semiconductor technology, “reliance on U.S.-based engineers for
technical and managerial experience and policy advice fundamentally shaped the direction and
pace of Taiwan's technology development.”32 In other words, while the policy decisions came
from within the public sector, in reality a network-based model for development—seen through
the STAG and TAC members professional backgrounds and networks— lead to the insightful
and far-reaching policy decisions of Taiwan’s public research consortia and leading technocrats.
The proposal for the HSP was part of a larger initiative to attract foreign investment in
Taiwan’s research-oriented companies, but at first the park failed to attract large MNCs industry
activity. Despite the park serving as “a high-technology version of an export-processing-zone,
one that offered subsidized land and financial incentives for R&D intensive manufacturing
tenants,” technology-intensive R&D firms were not persuaded to move their high-tech
manufacturing operations to the park.33 Taiwan’s bureaucrats sought out a different method of
catalyzing development in the park, and did so by promoting the introduction of private venture
capital firms to Taiwan. Saxenian may suggest without changes in the financial regulatory
structure—-Taiwan historically restricted financial decisions based off a patriarchal system
where family members closely controlled businesses financial affairs—as well as without initial
State-led efforts to recruit senior Chinese-American financiers to establish VC firms in Taiwan,
then the Hscinchu Science Park may not have succeeded in becoming “an open laboratory for the
growth of indigenous technology firms.34

32

Ibid., 143.

33 Anna
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Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 144.
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Breznitz also credits the introduction of private VC firms as an important factor
supplying the capital necessary for launching semiconductor firms and enhancing these firms
R&D capabilities. However, he diverges from Saxenian by claiming “Li’s and subsequent
government initiatives have taken great care to make sure the Taiwanese VC industry stays
Taiwanese, devoting all their attention to motivating local investor participation.”35 While
Saxenian admits much of the financing for Taiwan’s initial VC firms came from within existing
Taiwanese industry, she would also highlight the significant impact of U.S.-educated overseas
Chinese engineers, like Peter Liu and Lip-Bu Tan, who established Taiwan’s second U.S.-style
venture fund, the Walden International Investment Group.”36 Significantly, Saxenian and
Breznitz again diverge on the role and impact of State regulatory decisions, pertaining finance
and financial options, in regard to employee stock-options, designed to attract and maintain highvalue talent.
Breznitz argues that owing to the structure of Taiwan’s financial regulations, which only
allows employee stock options for firms who are already public, the structure incentivizes top
engineering talent to enter the employment of entrenched firms like TSMC and UMC. In turn,
this reduces the flow of top IT engineering talent towards smaller firms with more specialized
and riskier development strategies; thereby reducing first-generation technology innovation.37
Saxenian may agree that these policies create a fast-track for engineers to enter Taiwan’s top
firms, but simultaneously these favorable financial policies, which also include the elimination of
any capital gains tax, resulted in a massive influx of ethnic returnee engineers and
35

Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 141.

36 Anna
37

Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 147.
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entrepreneurs.38 Oftentimes these returnees enter an entrenched pureplay- foundry model firm
like TSMC or UMC, and after earning significant profits, leaves to create a new firm or become
part of a spin-off firm that continues to carve out niches in a global division of secondarygeneration complementary technology. While Breznitz is concerned that the structure of this
financial incentive system will reduce the likelihood of Taiwanese firms developing firstgeneration technologies, Saxenian suggests that attracting the most talented engineers and
bringing the most advanced human capital to Taiwan will result in a continuous process of firms
finding new niches in the global division of labor. In fact, returnees made up 42% of the
positions on founding teams for firms located in the Hsinchu Science Park in 2000.39 In other
words, while these firms may act as complements to existing innovative industry in high-tech
economies of advanced industrial nations, they continue to enhance the overall economies
technological level.

Conclusions
Breznitz vision of the ‘Innovation State’ and Saxenian’s account of returnee entrepreneur
network-led development are not in direct opposition to each other. Both authors recognize
similar trends and factors leading to the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor pureplayfoundry sector, but they fail to cohesively connect their complementary narratives. Taiwanese
State institutions, like ITRI, ERSO, NSC, TAC, and STAG as well as State financial policies,

38 Anna

Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 149.

39 Anna
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regarding venture capital and the financial regulatory structure, undoubtedly facilitated the
development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and continues to hold nominal levels of
development decision making power. However, these institutions and policies alone are
incapable of offering a complete picture of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry success.
Additionally, U.S-educated Taiwanese entrepreneurs, like Morris Chang, Dr. Wen Yuan
Pan and Dr. Ding-Yuan Yang, as well as others in key positions within Taiwan’s technocratic
class, provided industry expertise, connections and know-how from the leading semiconductor
and IT firms to Taiwan’s domestic industry. Without these entrepreneurs Taiwan’s semiconductor
development would have gone without managerial and technical expert guidance, as well as
policy advice. Additionally, without the connections to IT and semiconductor firms to the United
States, which the U.S-based engineers brought with them, then Taiwan’s semiconductor industry
would have struggled to integrate themselves into a complementary position within the global
division of labor.
Breznitz is correct that State policy deserves credit for Taiwan’s semiconductor
development, but he does not accurately depict the reasons why State policy was successful.
Taiwan’s State policy aimed to expand their technological level within semiconductor
manufacturing by actively targeting Saxenian’s network-led model of development. Likewise,
these returnee entrepreneurs and their networks aided Taiwan’s government facilitating the
development of the semiconductor industry from within the public sector. Neither State industrial
policy nor Saxenian’s network of transnational elites could accomplish the striking success of
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry without the other. Despite this fact, there are differences
between some of Taiwan’s top semiconductor firms that are a product of different development

Farley 2! 1
influences. Some of Taiwan’s domestic firms have origins stemming from the state, some have
semi-state origins and others have completely private VC origins. Although both Breznitz and
Saxenian’s development explanations are complementary and unable to exist without the other,
one may suspect differences in terms of the ability for a firm to produce at the cutting
technological edge in relationship with the firm origins. The next chapter will first look at the
timing of Taiwan’s key policy initiatives and decisions in relation to domestic firms development
decisions and global outsourcing and de-verticalization trends, as well as evaluate the direct
impact of these decisions on both Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as a whole, as well as a few
key semiconductor firms within Taiwan.

Farley 2! 2

Chapter 2
State-Driven Innovation in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry

Our discussion will now turn to the State public research consortia, policy initiatives,
advisory groups, and other public inputs Breznitz, Mathews and Cho, Fuller and others point to
as drivers of Taiwan’s semiconductor advancement. We will discuss how certain State-led actions
helped forge a path forward for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, as well as actions supporting
the relationships, incentives and other public inputs necessary for foreign technological
acquisition and domestic technological upgrading. Finally, we will focus our analysis on how
certain State-oriented actions impacted firms with state, semi-state and non-state origins
development decisions within the pureplay- foundry semiconductor sector, firms which other
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scholars like Breznitz and Saxenian target as a topic for empirical analysis. To provide the reader
with a better understanding of Taiwan’s domestic industry and the history of State driven
development, we will begin the chapter with a brief historical background of Taiwan.

Historical Context for the Development of the Modern Taiwan State
As discussed previously, Breznitz’ state-driven argument is largely founded in a vast
literature describing the developmental state. Additionally, Taiwan’s specific historical context,
even before the Kuomintang rise to power in 1949, has largely been a result of layers of heavyhanded government industrial policy. Under Japanese occupation, there were efforts to transform
the colony into a modern state; “Japanese colonialists introduced what were at the time modern
railways, a modern telephone and communications grid, a modern banking system, a highly
developed commercial market network, an effective public health system…even more important
was the expansion of literacy and technical training.”40 Following occupation, Taiwan
essentially operated under the undivided authority of Jiang Jieshi who achieved unity, though by
objectionable methods, which allowed modernizing bureaucrats more room to maneuver in
promoting industrialization and “gave capitalists confidence in the security of their investment in
Taiwan’s industry.”41 During the first 30-40 years of Taiwan’s development, Economic planning
remained firmly in control of the State, as well as within foreign allied development institutions
like USAID. In addition to serving traditional government roles like macroeconomic monetary
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and fiscal policy decisions, Taiwan’s prominent technocrats K. T. Li and K. Y. Lin, “believed in
the important role of government in helping to acquire technology, allocate funds for key
projects, and guide the development of the economy.”42 These bureaucrats were observers of
their fellow East Asian late developers and utilized similar protectionist policies quite common
within developmental states. Some example policies included protection of infant industries from
foreign competition, limiting the extent of foreign control in Taiwanese business, implementing
component requirements for firms intending to sell within Taiwan's domestic market, as well as
targeting sectors with growing wage demands within developed economies.43
Catalyzing Taiwan’s industrial development resulted in the creation of new state firms in
key areas such as steel, shipbuilding, electric power and nuclear power. While private industry
slowly was integrated into the system, the government largely held a monopoly over the
availability of credit, and had a large impact on picking the winners of development projects.44
Significantly, the Taiwanese financial system—which limits patient capital—is in stark contrast
to Gerschenkron and the developmental state models, which emphasize the need for capital rich
long-term loans often coming from the State.45 Essentially, the State took responsibility and
control over the upgrading of basic upstream industries, as well as infrastructure, in order to
supply the necessary inputs for private industry to thrive. This determination to protect Taiwan’s
infant industries, introduce new technologies, and minimize foreign investment helped local
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firms gain strength and avoid displacement by foreign MNCs. 46 For much of Taiwan’s early
development, Taiwan followed a slightly deviated developmental state model and filled a lead
role in guiding development decisions, as well as providing the necessary inputs for domestic
firms to succeed. With an understanding of Taiwan’s historical context, one can understand why
Breznitz’s analysis of Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor manufacturing industry tends to
continue to view development primarily through the lens of State institutions and policies.
The initial arrival of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan started when foreign firms
began to outsource testing and assembly stages of production during the 1960s. 47 At that time
Taiwan’s labor wage rates were significantly lower than the advanced industrialist economies.
Low wages combined with the stability of strong KMT rule meant for MNCs Taiwan was an
attractive nation to locate production. Additionally, Taiwan created the first Export Processing
Zone (EPZ) which offered tax incentives and eased labor regulations for foreign firms. As a
result a few U.S. semiconductor firms to moved their test and assembly stages of production to
Taiwan. While generally the EPZ should be considered a success, as it provided employment
opportunities for Taiwanese, assembly and testing stages of production does not require
sophisticated manufacturing technology; therefore, the EPZ was unsuccessful in upgrading
Taiwan’s technological level.48
The 1970s brought many major shocks to the established global order and it was during
this period that Taiwan’s bureaucrats began initiatives for major industrial and technological
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upgrading. While not directly connected to Taiwan’s plan for establishing more high-tech
industries, the fall of the Bretton Woods System, the Oil Shock of 1973, increasing neoprotectionist measures from advanced industrial economies and rising competition from other
low-cost labor economies made it clear to Taiwan’s bureaucrats that maintaining an economy
located in low-value added segments of the supply chain was increasingly unsustainable. 49 Some
scholars have argued it was Taiwan’s unique response to the economic challenges in the 70s that
differentiated the developmental style from similar late-developers such as Korea. The State’s
response to these challenges in the 70s marks the beginning of our analysis, which focuses on the
role of Taiwan’s government in the remarkable success of the semiconductor fabrication industry.

State Policies and Semiconductor Initiatives
Our discussion will now turn to the State public research consortia, policy initiatives,
advisory groups, and other public inputs Breznitz, Cho, Fuller and others point to as drivers of
Taiwan’s semiconductor advancement. We will discuss how certain State-led actions helped
forge a path forward for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, as well as actions supporting the
relationships, incentives and other public inputs necessary for foreign technological acquisition
and domestic technological upgrading. Finally, we will focus our analysis on how certain Stateoriented actions impacted firms with state, semi-state and non-state origins development
decisions within the pureplay- foundry semiconductor sector, firms which other scholars like
Breznitz and Saxenian target as a topic for empirical analysis.
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Breznitz and others like Hong Sul claim that Taiwan’s public research consortia, ERSO
and ITRI, led the fledgling semiconductor industry forward when capital sources were limited
and technological levels low. The literature universally points to the meeting of Dr. Y.H Sun and
Dr. Wen-yuan Pan, in August 1974, as a crucial starting point for the inception of these
consortia.50 Initially, as a result of the meeting, the organization ITRI was created. ITRI became a
central supporter of foreign technology acquisition for the first steps of Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry development. Interestingly, rather than selecting prominent State bureaucrats to lead the
push into high-tech electronics, Sun targeted ethnic Chinese engineers working in the U.S to lead
the push into the semiconductor industry and placed them in key positions within Technical
Advisory Commitee. The structure of the State policy, specifically the makeup of the TAC,
suggests attempts to incorporate the connections of these engineers within the policy decision
process. The TAC recommended ERSO’s creation in 1974 “whose head was immediately
charged with the task of developing the technological capabilities needed to generate a
semiconductor industry.” 51 ERSO successfully found a leading edge firm in RCA, which
willingly transferred their abandoned and out-of-date 7-micron CMOS semiconductor fabrication
technology.
According to Cho, when the TAC prepared a report for the Taiwan cabinet on their
proposal to create a semiconductor industry, one of the requests was “CMOS was to be the
technology of choice.”52 Although CMOS technology was invented in 1963 by Frank Winless,
CMOS technology did not become mainstream until the introduction of the 256Kb CMOS
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DRAM in 1984, which followed the decision of ERSO to focus developing CMOS process
technology. 53 Mathews and Cho argue “the capacity to ‘read’ technological trajectories provides
one of the critical points of leverage that latecomers need in order to effect entry.”54 This
decision was not based off of any ‘latecomer’ advantages as Gerschenkron may suggest, but
instead was the direct result of a forward-looking State. Without this favorable technical
decision, one may argue the State’s attempt to create an indigenous semiconductor fabrication
industry would not have achieved the same level of success. While this decision was done by
State institutions, and later followed by the private industry, without the structure of the policy
making institutions being heavily influenced by the U.S- based Taiwanese engineers, such as Dr.
Wen-Yuan Pan, RCA may not have transferred any CMOS technology and Taiwan’s technical
edge may have diminished.
ITRI and ERSO’s agreement with RCA proved to be a watershed moment for Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry. RCA agreed to train forty of Taiwan’s top young engineers, many of
them graduates of U.S engineering higher education institutions, in wafer processes, design and
chip manufacturing. 55 Following training, the engineers returned to ERSO and ITRI helping
advance the organizations semiconductor processes from 7 to 4.5 micron technology. With
RCA’s technology and know-how transfer, ERSO successfully spun-off the public semiconductor
development project into a private-public partnership to form the firm United Microelectronics
(UMC). These engineers continued to play a central role in Taiwan’s remarkable semiconductor
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success. Many of them, including Tsai Ming-Kai now CEO of MediaTek, after working within
the public consortia left to join State spinoff firms like UMC or TSMC, and then later founded or
joined Taiwan’s rising private semiconductor firms in the late 80s and 90s.
Breznitz and Cho both suggest that State institutions like ERSO not only aided Taiwan’s
technological upgrading by acting as a diffuser of foreign technology, but also served as a focal
point for Taiwanese innovation. This was especially true for the successful State spinoffs of
UMC and TSMC. Following ERSO’s initial technology acquisition and technical training with
RCA, the public consortia successfully and independently upgraded their micron technology and
aimed to commercialize this upgrade by forming a public-private company.56 In addition to
receiving all its technical staff and technology directly from ERSO, UMC was also granted
technical assistance from, and the use of, ERSO’s fabrication plant.57 Without ERSO’s support,
UMC’s acquisition of technical talent (human capital) would have remained a challenge for the
fledgling firm. The challenge was to then raise the initial capital requirement for
commercializing ERSO’s fabrication technology. Without the capital provided by the ministry of
economic affairs (MoEA), UMC’s capital sources would have been insufficient due to a reticent
private capital sector.58
While the founding of UMC put Taiwan’s semiconductor firmly integrated within the
global semiconductor industry, the introduction of TSMC and the pureplay-foundry model
revolutionized the entire industry and resulted in Taiwan’s top firms carving out market massive
niches at the high-tech manufacturing level of production. Following the success of UMC, in
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1981 the Science and Technological Advisory Group and specifically President and Premier Sun,
aggressively pushed the advancement of Taiwan’s VLSI capabilities to one micron level by
1988.59 After some back and forth between ERSO and UMC over where the fabrication facility
project should go, the State decided to designate ERSO as the entity charged with the project in
order to avoid an over concentration of power in a single private firm. 60 At this point, Taiwan’s
public research consortia continued to lead the way for domestic industry by providing advanced
research and development for designs processes and technologies. However, as semiconductor
design capabilities increased it became more and more evident that the lack of fabrication
manufacturing facilities forced Taiwanese semiconductor design firms to contract manufacturing
to third party manufactures, who were also potential competitors at the design stage of
production. For example, part of ERSO’s VLSI project was the development of DRAM chip
designs, and ERSO pursued a joint-venture strategy with ethnic Chinese Silicon Valley design
firm Vitelic. The project successfully designed a DRAM chip but then Vitelic sold the designs to
the Korean firm Hyundai, a project partially funded by the State, which caused rising concerns
that despite technological advancement Taiwanese firms would not fully capitalize on the
Industry’s increasing capabilities to generate high-tech intellectual property.61 In an effort to
provide advanced manufacturing facilities for Taiwan’s rising design firms, in 1985 ITRI
recruited Morris Chang, then CEO of General Instruments, to serve as president of the
institution. Significantly, “instead of proposing a conventional semiconductor company with its
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own product portfolio, Chang advocated for pure-play ‘silicon foundry’ operating VLSI process
technology to manufacture chips for small Taiwanese firms and international clients.”62
Raising the initial capital investment for the spin-off project, TSMC, was not an easy
task. Premier Yu at the time stipulated that the project must not be entirely financed by the
government in order to quicken the pace of private capital into Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry. 63 However, even in the 1980s the cost of building an advanced manufacturing facility
and the unattractive risk-return tradeoffs made it improbable that private capital would back such
a project.64 Breaking with Taiwanese conservative views of foreign direct investment, ITRI again
pursued a MNC joint-venture partner and eventually found one in the Dutch MNC Phillips. The
capital from Phillips gave them a 27.5% equity stake in TSMC, with another 48.3 % of the
investment coming from an investment arm of the KMT party, the China Development
Corporation.65 The State provided initial R&D, finance and human capital as many of ITRI’s
engineers, including Morris Chang, left to join the new spinoff company TSMC. Significantly,
TSMC and Phillips signed a cross-licensing agreement allowing TSMC the use of Phillips 2 and
1.5 micron process technologies. 66 This agreement allowed TSMC to utilize Phillips advanced
designs in their fabrication technology without risking potential legal liability. Following the
arrival of TSMC, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry rapidly expanded as private capital eventually
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recognized the potential for returns from Taiwan’s new niche in the high-tech semiconductor
global division of labor.
Many scholars argue the development of Taiwan’s industry had three distinct phases:
seeding, start-up, and expansion.67 Jou and Chen’s article “Keeping the High-tech region open
and dynamic: the organizational networks of Taiwan’s IC industry” focuses analysis on
organizational events. These events are separated by the periods of Taiwan’s high-tech
development, and defined as actions taken by high-tech organizations which influenced firm
organizational structure and development decisions.68 Additionally, events were divided into
categories of either technological, financial, or manufacturing. They suggest these events
facilitated Taiwan’s development of a vertically disintegrated agglomeration system in the
Hsinchu Science Park region.69 Specifically, during the seeding or infancy stage of Taiwan’s
high-tech development, the organizational events found by Jou and Chen’s study were mostly
organized by ITRI. Notedly, the location of these events were primarily in Taiwan and the United
States, which indicates ITRI understands the importance of and facilitated domestic firms
simultaneously developing organizational relationships within Taiwan’s highly disintegrated
local producer network, as well as within global networks. Following the seeding stage of
development, Taiwan’s private firms began to participate in organizational events in large
numbers. However, without the State's early attempts to connect domestic and global firms, as
well as the successful spin-offs of UMC and TSMC, these private firms would have lacked clear

67

Jou, Sue-Ching, and Dung-Sheng Chen. "Keeping the High-tech Region Open and Dynamic: The Organizational
Networks of Taiwan's Integrated Circuit Industry." GeoJournal 53, no. 1 (2001): 83.
68

Ibid., 82.

69

Ibid., 82.

Farley 3! 3
examples for potential returns owing to these industry interactions, and as a result may have
pursued a different expansion strategy.
Taiwan’s government is largely responsible for launching Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry primarily due to ERSO and ITRI’s successful spin-off companies, TSMC and UMC,
which are now the pureplay-foundry leaders within Taiwan and compete against other leading
global firms like Intel, Samsung and Texas Instruments. State technocrats and groups like the
TAC and STAG took the first steps towards supporting global and domestic information
exchange by placing ethnic Chinese engineers with experience in the U.S. industry as key
decision makers within public institutions. The State circumvented private capital’s reticence to
invest in Taiwan’s fledgling high-tech semiconductor industry by providing public R&D
spending, public capital as well as human capital support for creating the spin-off companies
TSMC and UMC. Without these initial State-led efforts to establish the semiconductor industry,
where technocrats led prescient decisions to pursue CMOS processing technology, as well as
avoid over concentration of industry activity within a single national champion firm, then
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would likely not have achieved such a high level of success.

Public Inputs Supporting Cross Cultural and Cross-Industry Communication
The State’s impact over Taiwan’s semiconductor development trajectory did not begin or
end with the successful spinoffs of ERSO and ITRI. In fact, many State directives were not
directly connected to public R&D spending, guiding industry or firm level technical
development decisions, and State capital injections (human, financial) directly into the domestic
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industry. Additionally, as discussed briefly previously, State institutions, like ITRI and the HSIP,
took an active role in establishing cross industry connections by opening offices in Silicon Valley
and initiating the first ‘organizational events’ for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Taiwan’s
government took a society wide approach by utilizing all the instruments at the State’s disposal
including providing tax benefits, as well as educational and industry infrastructure to incentivize
and attract ethnic Chinese engineers from overseas. Not all government support comes in the
form of direct involvement with industry.
A signature development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was the creation of the
Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park (HSIP). Again, this policy came directly from State
organizations, which in this case was the National Science Council (NSC). The HSIP is
universally acknowledged as the center of Taiwan’s innovative and high-tech activity. The park
continues to favor firms with significant R&D operations, as the HSIP often matched firm’s
R&D levels, as well as gives special subsidies including tax holidays, exemption on equipment
importation and commodity exports and low-interest loans.70 Additionally, the park provides
specialized infrastructure including housing and education for foreign-based engineers and their
families.71 The State sponsored upgrading of the educational infrastructure in the park, such as
the creation the International Bilingual School at Hsinchu Science Park, is a clear example of
State policy indirectly yet actively targeting these returnee entrepreneurs. The school is jointly
overseen by the Ministry of Education and the National Science Council and offers courses
taught in english, including American history, as well as offers Advanced Placement classes.
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Significantly, according to the schools website, recently the school has also included
requirements for mandarin and Chinese cultural classes, which perhaps indicates China as an
important location for expanding Taiwan’s high-tech development. While the State created the
park and provided the capital for the project, the idea for high-tech parks already existed, like
Silicon Valley, albeit in a different form. The HSIP is a clear example of State policy attempting
to mirror and catalyze a network-based model of development by creating attractive benefits for
returnee entrepreneurs and their families.
Taiwan’s technocrats often attempted to connect industry with local technical schools like
National Taiwan University and National Tsing-Hua University. During ERSO’s development of
VLSI technology, the organization attempted to seed VLSI capabilities in Taiwan’s technical
schools by providing projects to professors and their students.72 The National Science Council
made significant financial commitments to semiconductor research with local universities, even
despite some government opposition.73 Additionally, the location of the HSIP as well as ITRI is
in close proximity to National Taiwan University and National Tsing-Hua University.
Significantly, the fact that the HSIP was deliberately located adjacent to top technical universities
mirrors other high-tech clusters, like Silicon Valley. The HSIP not only emulates a Silicon Valley
style of high-tech clustering, the HSIP as well as other public organizations like ITRI established
offices in Silicon Valley where “they quickly built local industry organizations in order to
monitor industrial and technical trends for domestic producers.”74 These organizations believed
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that upgrading technologically on the domestic front meant fostering industry relationships
abroad, specifically within the United States technical communities.
Taiwan’s National Science Council has served an important and changing set roles in the
development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, including leading initiatives like the
foundation of the HSIP. Following the derecognition of Taiwan’s government by the United
States, Japan and other Western government in the 1970s, “the NSC has remained in close touch
with equivalent organizations in these countries, primarily through paradiplomatic channels.”75
Significantly, while the NSC played an important role in “the upgrading of Taiwan’s industrial
infrastructure,” the organization must compete for funding with other S&T development
organization such as the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
Council for Economic Planning and Development, the Ministry of Telecommunications and
others all supporting various State sponsored R&D projects. 76 This unique decentralized
infrastructure encouraged State support of basic research projects, that act as the foundation for
the commercialized R&D of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, while also discouraging State
consortia and institutions from over-prioritizing certain projects with closer connections to the
State.
Taiwan’s government utilized a range of policy tools and public inputs in order to attract
MNC’s as well as ethnic Chinese engineer returnees to Taiwan. While Taiwan offered generous
tax benefits, capital injections, public R&D and favorable regulations, the State took also too a
cumulative societal approach by emphasizing integrating industry with academia, providing
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high-level educational opportunities for an international workforce, as well as creating the
Hscinhu Science Park. In the next section, we will turn our focus to assess if these State policies
significantly impacted both State spinoff, as well as private firms, development trajectories.

State Inputs Impacting Firm-level Development Decisions in State Spinoff and Private Firms
While the onslaught of global economic forces, as well as the fragmentation and vertical
disintegration of production has severely reduced State’s ability to direct development decisions,
Taiwan’s government, like any other, maintains responsibility for setting the regulations and
benchmarks for the development of institutional structures. The structure of a system informs
and shapes actors decisions within a system; therefore, the State retains a large degree of impact
over industry because all industries rely on public sector institutional inputs. An often discussed
unique Taiwanese State policy is the structure of the financial system. A system which limits
patient capital discourages the formation of massive long-term focused capital intensive firms,
while also encourages the development of small and medium sized enterprises focused on short
term profits. Unlike comparable East Asian economies, Taiwan lacks massive corporate
conglomerates, like the Korean Chaebols or Japanese Keiretsu, which in a sense prevents
investment in capital intensive markets like the DRAM memory market.77 Even within Taiwan’s
semiconductor manufacturing sector, which requires increasingly large R&D and capital
investment, in 1993 only 68% of revenue from Taiwan’s foundry market came from the top three
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firms compared to 96% concentration in Korea.78 While the industry developed the concentration
of revenue in Taiwan’s top firms increased, Taiwan still maintains many small to medium sized
IC design and select foundry firms. While one can argue that this is at least part due to the
structure of Taiwan’s financial system set up by Taiwan’s conservative bureaucrats, the historical
context of Taiwan also plays a significant role in determining the scale of business
organization.79
Taiwan’s medium to small sized semiconductor firms in part developed as a result of
Taiwan’s unique financial system, which reduced the amount of patient capital in circulation. As
noted in the previous section, one of the main reasons the State decided to pursue fabrication
capabilities was the result of Taiwan’s smaller and medium sized firms having to give their
designs to potential competitors in order to manufacture their product. With that said, without
Taiwan’s domestic producer environment, a system with large numbers of small to medium sized
firms, perhaps the State would not have easily recognized the potential benefits of developing
modular VLSI fabrication capabilities. More specifically, ITRI may not have pursued Morris
Chang and the pureplay-foundry vision he advocated for.
These smaller-scale firms, like Winbond Electronics Corporation, are unable to compete
with TSMC or UMC’s successful economies of scale model of production. As a result, evidence
supports the trend that companies are forced to specialize within small niches of the
semiconductor industry’s division of labor. Additionally, smaller firms, like VIS, that fail to
specialize— investing heavily in R&D activities—results in lower rates of technological
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advancement, thereby disadvantaging the firm. When comparing TSMC and Winbond
Electronics R&D to net income ratio from 2002 to 2005, one can clearly see that Winbond, a
smaller as well as late-comer firm compared to TSMC, not only invests a higher percentage of
their net income in R&D, but also invests at times up to 400% of their net income into R&D
investments.80 While Winbond still has a gap between firm level fabrication technological
capabilities and the cutting edge of Taiwan’s semiconductor pureplay-foundry sector TSMC,
Winbond maintains a near identical rate of technological-advancement. Meanwhile, VIS has a
lower percentage R&D to net income ratio than TSMC and achieved no significant technological
advancement in fabrication technology during the same time. Owing to the structure of the
State’s bureaucratic and financial system, which structurally limits the concentration of industry
power and favoring natural rather than national champions, results in Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry containing both large and medium sized firms. This structural difference, largely
influenced by State development decisions, results in medium sized and or late arriving firms
investing a disproportionate amount of firm net income into R&D. High levels of investment in
R&D is an indicator for a firm’s level of specialization. In other words, a unique characteristic of
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry development is the tendency for smaller and medium sized
firms to specialize and carve out smaller and smaller niches within the semiconductor supply
chain division of labor.
Sigficantly, Winbond Electronics is a firm that was not technically a State spinoff firm,
but does have semi-state origins. Winbond’s founder, Dr Ding Yuan Yang was the former head of
ERSO’s pilot semiconductor manufacturing facility as well as an alumni of the RCA 40. He, like
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many of Taiwan’s most successful engineers, started his career in the United States and was
recruited back to Taiwan to serve as the head of ERSO’s fab. Dr Yang decided to leave ERSO on
his own accord and found an investor in Walshin Lihaw Corporation, an original investor in
UMC, and privatized ERSO’s lab while also hiring may of the ERSO staff working at the fab.81
Winbond’s background with ERSO, where Winbond’s very same engineers helped successfully
spin-off UMC and TSMC, perhaps gave the new private firm a competitive edge as they were
quickly able to acquire high-level technical talent from State sources. 82 While true, the semi-state
origin of Winbond allowed the firm to pass over significant barriers to entry, other firms also
successfully broke through barriers of entry without any State background, firms like Macronix
International. Significantly, these private firms development decisions are still in part impacted
by State inputs like the structure of the financial system.
Macronix (MXCI), founded in 1989, was one of the first semiconductor firms in Taiwan
financed with venture capital. Macronix raised sufficient funds to establish a VLSI fab in the
HSIP with advanced micron processes as well as hire over 40 Chinese-Americans with
experience in the US semiconductor industry.83 Macronix is another example of how Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry pursued intense specialization, resulting in competitive advantages and
market niches. Macronix, similar to TSMC, aggressively pursued strategic technology alliances
and joint-development strategies with large MNC’s. Specifically, Macronix attempted to pursue
DRAM memory chip fabrication technologies by partnering with leading Japanese and other
MNC firms like, Matsushita Electric Industrial, not as a way to compete in the DRAM market,
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but in order to build technological expertise and eventually offer specialized DRAM chip
services.84 It’s a testament to the success of UMC and TSMC assuaging investors concerns that a
firm with private capital origins was willing to enter such a capital-intensive and high-risk
market like DRAM production. These partnerships, as well as high R&D to net income ratios
50% in 1999, 48% in 2004, 42% in 2006—- were significantly higher than TSMC during these
same years—ultimately resulted in the firm maintaining relevance despite it’s relatively small
size compared to market leaders TSMC and Intel.85 Regardless of firms origins, in order to
remain competitive and carve out market niches, Taiwan’s smaller to medium sized
semiconductor fabrication firms generally maintain extremely high levels of R&D to net income
ratios.
Notably, TSMC generally has significant lower levels of R&D to net income ratios
compared to leading edge competitors Intel, Texas Instruments and Samsung. For example, in
2003 TSMC R&D to net income ratios was 33.465% while the combined average of Intel, Texas
Instruments and Samsung was 92%; in 2005 TSMC R&D to net income ratio was 14.3% while
the combined average of Intel, Texas Instruments and Samsung was 63.8%. 86 The data suggests
in order to remain competitive at the cutting edge, even large firms with successful economies of
scale invest heavily in R&D. Significantly, the large gap between TSMC and it’s competitors
may be a result of the data not differentiating between types of R&D within the Intel, Texas
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Instruments and Samsung’s multiple different markets. Unfortunately, the data provided does not
categorize these firms R&D into market sectors, like the pureplay-foundry.
The firms Winbond, Macronix, and TSMC are respectively semi-state, private, and state
origin firms that all exhibit high levels of specialization. Notably, the smaller to medium sized
firms, Winbond and Macronix, consistently demonstrate higher levels of R&D to net income
ratios compared to industry leader TSMC. The data ultimately suggests that late-comer firms in
high-tech late-developing economies must maintain disproportionately high levels of R&D in
order to specialize and find new niches within the division of labor. While this may partially be a
result of State inputs and polices creating a financial system favoring the development of smaller
to medium sized firms, as well as State R&D incentives and requirements within the HSIP which
often matched R&D levels of the firms within the HSIP and required high levels of R&D in the
first place, there may be other factors within the industry that encouraged increasing levels of
specialization and continuous splits in the division of labor.
In this chapter we found that firm level decisions are impacted by a multitude of factors,
and State inputs and infrastructure certainly impacts these decisions. When private capital was
unwilling to make risky initial investments and R&D, public consortia like the ERSO and ITRI
forged the path forward for Taiwan’s domestic semiconductor industry. State policy aimed to
attract and retain the technical talent of U.S.-based ethnic Chinese engineers by including them
in advisory groups charged with setting the domestic industry’s goals and standards. Favorable
tax incentives and public infrastructure like the HSIP, which offered schools for international
students, are examples of State policy not only aiming to attain the human capital of these
returnees, but also the connections and resources of multinational corporations. While we’ve
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seen how the State incorporated these returnees into State infrastructure, further analysis on the
backgrounds and experiences of the leading engineers, founder, and CEOs is necessary to
understand their contributions to Taiwan’s domestic semiconductor industry.
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Chapter 3:
Ethnic Returnee Networks and the Development of Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry

Quantifying the impact of individual returnee entrepreneurs is a difficult task as many of
their influences took an institutional form through the advisory committees and public consortia
they engaged and worked with. In order to truly understand the depth of their contributions, the
following discussion will first analyze the educational and professional backgrounds of key
policy advisors and engineers involved with Taiwan’s semiconductor industry during the seeding
stage to understand how their experiences helped shape key initial decisions, link Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry with the global industry, and facilitate early technological advancements.
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This chapter will explore and analyze the incentives and motivations behind the return of ethnic
Chinese talent including State tax policies and other public inputs, as well as other cultural,
historical and personal motivations significant to the return of Chinese diaspora. In the final
section we will turn our focus on the expansion and spreading out phase of Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry and explore how returnee entrepreneurs continued to lead Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry to achieve cutting edge technological upgrades and product
specialization. Our discussion will first turn to a literary anecdote in order to provide the reader a
complex understanding for reasons behind both the dispersal and return of the professional
Chinese diaspora.

Abroad and Home Again: A Literary Introduction to Taiwan’s Returnee Talent
The life of Saxenian's returnee entrepreneurs, specifically in the United States, is often
reflected in Taiwan’s literary culture. For example, “Winter Nights” by Bai Xianyong, a writer
born in Guilin China at the cusp of the Second Sino-Japanese war who left mainland China for
Taiwan at a young age, is relevant in our discussion of Taiwanese returnee entrepreneurs and
engineers as the story is primarily a dialogue between two former classmates at Beijing
University, U.C Berkeley professor Wu Zhugao, and Taiwan University professor Yu Qinlei.
Through their personal narratives we can attain a deeper understanding of the historical and
cultural motivations for ethnic Chinese returnees returning home, as well as leaving home, which
ultimately creates bidirectional movement of Taiwanese talent between the United States and
Taiwan.
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The story begins with a vivid description of Yu Qinlei’s home in Taiwan, serving as a
metaphor for his life and current condition. “The house that Professor Yu made his shelter looked
exactly the same as the other University quarters in the alley, old buildings that had survived the
Japanese occupation. It bore all the scars of long neglect…moldering with decay and
disrepair.”87 Later we discover that Qinlei is actually in “disrepair” as he had an accident during
the May Fourth protests at Beijing University, while he and Wu Zhugao were classmates, which
was further damaged by poor medical treatment at Taiwan University Hospital.88 The narrative
highlights the backwardness of Taiwan's society, specifically focusing on a lack of technological
progress. Yu Qinlei views his old classmate’s successful tenured life abroad at an American
university with admiration and a sense of longing to have had lead a similar life abroad.89 He
also had paid for his two children to study engineering abroad at great personal financial
expense. His youngest son when meeting Wu Zhu Gao took the opportunity to ask the American
professor “‘Is it true that the Physics Department (At U.C. Berkeley) often spends more than half
a million dollars on one single experiment?’ Jungian’s youthful face gleamed with envy.”90 Yu
Qinlei’s see’s both his future and his children’s future abroad, expressing awe and hopefulness at
the opportunity for U.S-based experience, especially in high-level scientific research. These
sentiments underpinned the brain drain in Taiwan, but what Yu Qinlei does not understand is the
strong feelings of those abroad like Wu Zhugao with a deep sense of yearning to return home.
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Upon Professor Wu Zhugao’s long-awaited return to Taiwan, the Central Daily News
noted that his arrival and lectures attracted the likes of more than one hundred Taiwanese
scholars and dignitaries.91 The professor is happy to give his lectures to Taiwan’s academic and
technocratic audiences. In fact, the next morning after his visit with Qinlei, Professor Wu
planned to visit Taiwan Political University for a lecture. 92 Despite his excitement to contribute
to Taiwan, and connect academica with Taiwan's technocratic class, Wu Zhugao carries a deep
guilt and shame for abandoning his home and living life abroad. He specifically refers to himself
as feeling like “one of Emperor Xuan Zong’s white haired ladies, who just kept telling foreigners
anecdotes of the Tianbao reign.” 93 During the Tang dynasty Emperor Xuan Zong's court ladies
are depicted in Tang funerary sculpture to represent both grace and beauty, which mirrors Wu
Zhugao’s extension contributions to his field.94 However, like the older court ladies who often
left home to join the court, he feels separated from his home and his only purpose to entertain the
foreigners around him. Wu Zhugao feels alone while abroad, especially after his wife has passed,
and plans to return to Taiwan and engage Taiwan's academic community.95
Bai Xianyong’s story is not condemning ethnic Chinese who left for intellectual and other
pursuits abroad, but instead a celebration for individuals who returned to act as conduits between
their native country and highly developed countries like the United States. The story also
highlights motivations behind a bi-gration, both Taiwanese professionals leaving to pursue
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further education and returning to find community and home, that focus more on cultural and
historical sentiments rather than only monetary. The author’s decision to have Qinlei’s son study
engineering was a prescient choice, especially knowing the rapid increase of engineering
students as well as technological development in Taiwan that ensued during the following
decades. Although the share of Taiwanese abroad students in the United States has declined
since the mid 1990, the U.S continues to be the most attractive place for Taiwanese students
studying abroad. Students like the Taiwanese professor's son, and the advice of academics or
career professionals abroad, like Professor Wu Zhugao, would later aid in Taiwan’s technological
leap-frogging.

Key Returnees in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Seeding Stage of Development
Many returnee entrepreneurs and engineers joined advisory committees and public
consortia early in the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. The following discussion
will analyze the educational and professional backgrounds of key policy advisors and engineers
involved with Taiwan’s industry during the seeding stage of the semiconductor industry to
attempt to quantify how their experiences shaped key initial development decisions, link
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry with the global industry, and facilitate early technological
advancements.
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Breznitz argues that the influence of the returnee entrepreneurs only started after the
returnees saw an economic opportunity in Taiwan, and not vice-versa.96 Breznitz’ view undercuts
and fails to understand the importance of foreign based ethnic Chinese advisors, primarily from
the United States, who helped guide Taiwan’s semiconductor industry development when the
industry was still in its infancy. Specifically the Technical Advisory Board (TAC) as well as the
Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) had significant foreign based membership.97 In
1974, Dr. Wen Yuan Pan, an RCA engineer, following an invitation from the Minister of
Economic Affairs Dr. Y.S. Sun, established and led The TAC. The TAC, consisting of and led by
Dr. Pan and Chinese engineers working for leading US electronics firms like IBM and Bell Labs,
prepared a report to the Taiwan Cabinet on how to seed a semiconductor industry in Taiwan. The
report recommended the following initiatives; Taiwan execute technology transfer agreements by
inviting U.S firms to bid for a contact and specifically targeting CMOS technology, as well as
offering technical training for engineers in the United States, and this activity was to be centered
in a State agency.98
Dr. Wen Yuan Pan is known by many as the father of Tawian’s Semiconductor industry
and in an interview with ‘medium.com’ Anna Lee Saxenian notes “Pan’s involvement certainly is
a striking addition to our knowledge of the early ties linking Silicon Valley and regions in Asia.”
Born in China, Pan received his undergraduate education at Shanghai Jiaotong University and
pursued a post-graduate degree in electrical engineering at Stanford University. Pan had a
difficult journey as one of China’s first leading electrical engineers. In fact, his Stanford
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education almost prematurely ended with the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s, however
he chose to stay in the United States to continue his education with hopes to return home and
improve China’s technological level. Pan worked at RCA for over thirty years where he was
credited for securing over 30 patents. 99 While the communist victory prevented Pan’s return to
mainland China, he found many former colleagues from his time at Jiaotong University working
in Taiwan, which— along with the fact his wife’s family had strong ties to upper echelons of
Taiwan’s government—ultimately led him to pursue his dream of upgrading his home country in
Taiwan.
Even prior to his involvement with the Technical Advisory Board, Pan had been working
with his counterparts in Taiwan by regularly organizing meetings of overseas Chinese engineers.
These efforts would become known as the ‘Modern Engineering and Technology Seminars,’
which Taiwan’s returnee entrepreneurs early involvement in building connections between
overseas Chinese engineers and Taiwanese technocrats. Significantly, the Chinese Institute of
Engineers, established in 1917, helped coordinate these meetings and specifically focused on
bringing together leading engineers with Taiwanese technocrats. 100 According to the CIE-USA
website, the organization and it’s Taiwanese counterparts will continue to provide technical and
science seminars, as well as career development seminars and leadership seminars for continuous
promotion of technological advancement and exchange in the United States and abroad. Dr.
Pan’s individual role in developing Taiwan’s semiconductor is exhibited by a letter he sent to Dr.
E. E. Terman, a Stanford professor known as the father of Silicon Valley and a mentor to Dr. Pan.
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I proposed a 3-phase project to develop the LSI MOS technology in Taiwan for a total
Government funding of the order of ten million dollars as follows. Phase 1: 1975-1978
Technology transfer from several U.S. universities and a U.S. industrial company. Phase
II: 1978-1980 Pilot production of standard circuits and several custom circuits to supply
the local needs. Phase III: 1980-1985 Will gradually transfer the technology and
facilities to the local industry. To my delight, the project was quickly approved, as
proposed, and I now find myself deeply involved in helping the Industrial Technology
Research Institute (ITRI) for implementation. We have already reached amiable
agreements with the University of Florida in Gainesville and the Case-Western Reserve
University in Cleveland for technical personal trainings. 101
Dr. Pan’s letter suggests his ideas had an extremely high-level of influence over the development
trajectory of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Dr. Pan’s experience at RCA largely facilitated
RCA’s decision to share their out-dated CMOS logic processing technology with ERSO/ITRI. 102
Dr. Pan contributed greatly to Taiwan’s semiconductor development prior to the industry
becoming highly profitable— suggesting that although economic incentives are significant in
attracting top-talent, shared history and cultural identity also represent significant motivators for
the return of ethnic Chinese high-tech talent. Dr. Pan, however, may have included in his
proposal for the intention of the State to gradually transfer the technology and facilities to the
local industry as a means to signal to other returnee’s that although high-tech developed will start
in the State, the benefits of Taiwan’s technological upgrading will eventually reach the private
market and those poised to lead it.
Other foreign members of the TAC would later return to Taiwan to serve different roles
both within State institutions like ERSO/ITRI, as well as within the Taiwan’s private
semiconductor industry as it developed in the late 80s and early 90s. Dr. Genda Hu, left Silicon
Valley to serve as general director of ERSO/ITRI and now is the vice president of TSMC. Hu
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suggests “the U.S. experience had a tremendous impact on my generation. We were exposed to
world-class researchers and leading-edge technical opportunities. We observed firsthand the
growth of the electronics and computer industries, and how business models and mentalities
were changing.” 103 These foreign returnees in advisory boards like the TAC lead and empowered
others success by taking their know-how and contributing both in providing technical expertise
and managerial experience as well as knowledge of industry practices and trends. These
contributions guided the seeding of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. The foreign returnee
contributions within the State at ITRI and ERSO helped to upgrade Taiwan’s technological
capabilities and provide leverage when engaging with the global market. Many of these advisory
board returnees later served as leaders within the industry’s private firms.
Saxenian argues that organizations like ERSO and ITRI have “limited control over the
pace and direction of innovation in domestic industry. However, the public sector has played a
crucial role in the governance of the industrial system.”104 She supplements her argument by
pointing to key industrial policy decisions like avoiding the creation of publicly funded ‘national
champion’ firms, as well as other important inputs like investments in higher education and
research and training. While Saxenian accurately highlights the role of the State in creating a
supportive ecosystem for the development of specialized producers, in some sense, her claim
under appreciates the efforts of Taiwan’s returnee engineers working within ITRI and ERSO
during the seeding stage of industry. During this stage, ITRI upgraded the technological capacity,
later dispersed to all of Taiwan, and also spun-off the two most successful pureplay-foundry
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companies in Taiwan (UMC and TSMC). Leading this charge were returnee engineers like DingYuan Yang.
Ding Yuan-Yang was born in Nanjing, China, where both his parents were chemical
engineers. He attended National Taiwan University, where he majored in electrical engineering.
Ding Yuan Yang, like many other talented students, sought education abroad at U.S. universities.
He attended Princeton University and received his Ph.D in Electrical Engineering in 1975.
According to ‘ithistory.org,’ he worked for a brief period in the United States at Harris
Semiconductor Company as a principal engineer. According to ‘computerhistory.org,’ Dr. DingYuan Yang was a founding member of ERSO, and led the RCA-37 in their technical training
overseas following the ERSO’s initial technology transfer agreement. Significantly, the State
actually provided for Yang’s Business Administration degree at Stanford, which came in useful
for Yang and the industry later when he spun-off ERSO’s then outdated fabrication facility into a
new company called Winbond in 1987. Without the leadership and expertise provided by
returnees like Ding-Yuan Yang, the ERSO may not have had the technical expertise necessary for
upgrading their outdated CMOS logic processing technology. Yang’s experience with the State
highlights a reciprocative positive relationship that characterized interactions between returnee
engineers and the State.
Taiwan’s public consortia, like the ERSO and ITRI, guided Taiwan’s early semiconductor
industry in terms of the setting the trajectory for semiconductor development, as well as
advancing technological innovation in Taiwan. Significantly, during the seeding stage of
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry the State relied upon the networks and advice of key returnee
engineers like Ding Yuan Yang and Dr. Pan who advised the State in organizations like the TAC
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and STAG, as well as offered their technical and managerial know-how within ERSO and ITRI.
These returnee engineers entered Taiwan’s nascent industry prior to any sign of profitability, but
they also helped structure the system to eventually reward the early leaders of Taiwan’s private
semiconductor industry. Our discussion will now turn to the contributions of Taiwan’s returnee
entrepreneurs in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry following the initial seeding stage of
development.

Semiconductor Start-ups and Returnee Networks: Engineers, CEOs and Capitalists
Taiwan’s desire to attract top-talent is not a unique strategy for late-developing States
pursuing high-tech industries. In fact, attracting top-talent is a global agenda that fosters
competition between many developing high-tech economies. Recruiting high-level technical
talent, or human capital, is a necessary first step to upgrading domestic tech industry and while
some returnees, like Dr. Pan and Dr. Yang, were attracted to Taiwan prior to the industry
becoming profitable, States cannot rely alone on shared ethnic ties and cultural identities. In the
following section, we will discuss how Taiwan aggressively pursued a high-technical class of
engineers by first demonstrating the potential of domestic industry with successful spinoffs UMC
and TSMC, but perhaps even more important, the State began offering generous financial
incentives for firms qualifying for the Taiwan Stock Exchange 105 Additionally, we will discuss
how the success of UMC and TSMC largely eliminated the risk-averse attitudes of domestic
venture capitalists, and facilitated the significant entry of private capital investment into Taiwan’s
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semiconductor industry. The contributions of these engineers, CEOs, and capitalists helped
Taiwan’s new semiconductor industry develop strategies that undoubtedly increased the level of
innovative activity, as well as avoid strategies that proved fallible in the returnees past
experiences working in leading U.S. semiconductor firms. Ultimately, we will discuss the
contributions of key returnees within the firms TSMC, Macronix, and Winbond by looking at
how their backgrounds and expertise shaped their firm’s development trajectory and relative
success.
Taiwan’s leading semiconductor fabrication firm, TSMC, is a globally competitive
advanced semiconductor manufacture well connected to both the State and Taiwan’s returnee
entrepreneurs. Prior to the arrival of Morris Chang, Taiwan’s bureaucrats recognized the need for
creating advanced fabrication manufacturing facilities to prevent the outsourcing of designs and
intellectual property, seen prominently by Vitelic’s sale of the partially publicly funded VLSI
project to Hyundai. As Clare Brown and Greg Linden note in their book Chips and Change
“relying on vertically integrated firms for fabrication raised intellectual property concerns
because of the information revealed when the design was passed to the fab, and the possibility
the fab owner might decide to enter the fabless company’s market.”106 Under Morris Chang’s
leadership ITRI recognized these problems, but also recognized the potential of developing a
firm that complemented the existing industry ecosystem by focusing solely on the fabrication of
chips rather than the prevalent model of large integrated device manufacturers (IDMs). 107
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Morris Chang, although now retired, was not the lone returnee in TSMC. In fact, sixteen
of nineteen senior executives came to TSMC with American graduate degrees and work
experience; additionally, although Robert Tsao CEO of UMC was not a returnee himself, in
1997, five of the top nine senior executives in the company held American graduate degrees. 108
Chang himself claims that the returnees "most important contribution is their experience in
managing world-class companies like HP, Intel, and Bell Labs. They bring the disciplined
management style of these businesses.” 109 While in the past, Taiwanese businesses were
primarily run as family businesses, bringing in the returnees with management experience in
prominent U.S firms perhaps signaled to U.S firms that TSMC and others were mirroring the
business standards and practices of the existing semiconductor industry. As a result, leading edge
semiconductor firms were more likely to work and collaborate with the Taiwanese domestic
semiconductor industry.
Technical advances also facilitated this vertical disintegration shift in the organization of
production including the solidification of MOS fabrication technology as the mainstream, which
“provided a predictable technology trajectory for designers to follow,” as well as improvement in
design transfer technology that allowed for fabless firms to seamlessly transfer their chip designs
to Fabs specifically utilizing the Berkeley Transistor Simulator Model (BSIM).110 Technical
changes helped facilitate the transition to fab/fabless production models, but it was also Morris
Chang’s understanding of global business trends which led ITRI to pursue a pureplay foundry
firm. Clare Brown and Greg Linden also note that challenges within the semiconductor industry
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are often linked together, suggesting the importance of maintaining industry-wide connections
and practices to better understand future development trajectories. For example, Fabrication
firms, or pureplay-foundries, should pay close attentions to advances in lithography technology
as “one of the central drivers of fab cost is lithography equipment, which typically accounts for
20 percent of the fixed cost of an advanced fabrication facility.”111
While the innovative activity of the ERSO and ITRI significantly decreased following the
initial spinoffs of UMC and TSMC, the legacy of these State institutions continued to support the
developing private industry. “The ITRI has about a 15 per cent turn over rate annually, which
implies that each year about 800 of ITRI/ERSO’s staff leave to join private firms or to start their
own businesses.”112 In fact, by 2000, specifically in the HSIP, a total of 4,108 returnees from
overseas worked in the Science Park as well 4,464 ITRI alumni.113 While ITRI no longer
maintained its central role in terms of technology acquisition and technological development, the
ITRI personal, many of whom were U.S.- based returnee engineers, were now armed with global
industry connections from their time working abroad, State connections from their time working
within State institutions, as well as local connections between their co-workers as many went on
to found domestic firms. As a result, returnees were disproportionately likely to become
entrepreneurs. Out of the 289 companies located in the HSIP in 2000, 42% of these companies
founding teams were at least partially made up with returnee engineers.114 For example, the firm
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Macronix was founded by returnee engineer and CEO Miin Wu, who also recruited over 40 U.Sbased ethnic Chinese engineers for the launching of his successful company.115
Following the founding of TSMC and the falling back of ERSO and ITRI’s role in
guiding the semiconductor industry, the number of Taiwan’s IT industry ‘organizational events’
dramatically increased. From 1976 to 1985 Jou Sue-Ching and Chen Dung-Shen’s study found
that there were 11 total events facilitating organizational connections among Taiwan’s local
producers as well as among Taiwan’s domestic IT industry and primarily U.S- based firms. In the
following 10 years, 1985-1995, the same study found there were 348 ‘organizational events’
creating domestic and global IT industry networks.116 While the data collected was based on all
IT industry activity in Taiwan, we contend that the magnitude of difference between Taiwan's
semiconductor industry and Taiwan's IT industry is minimal. Additionally, from 1985 to 1995,
the number of returning entrepreneurs in Taiwan skyrocketed.117 Ultimately, the data suggests
that while the State’s public consortia played an important initial role in developing industry
connections both within and outside of Taiwan, when the rate of ethnic Chinese U.S- based
engineers entering Taiwan's semiconductor dramatically increased, so did cross-regional
Taiwanese semiconductor industry connections.
Macronix, founded in 1988, is an excellent case study for examining the impact of
returnee engineers, CEOs and venture capitalists as the firm was one of Taiwan’s first
semiconductor firms completely funded by venture capital and the first semiconductor firm to be
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listed on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange. Founder and CEO Miin Wu received his Master’s
degree in Material Science and Engineering from Stanford University. According to Macronix’s
corporate website, prior to establishing Macronix, he held senior and managerial positions with
VLSI Technology Inc, Intel Corp, Rockwell International and Silixonix Inc. in Silicon Valley. As
the first semiconductor firm listed on Taiwan’s Stock Exchange, Macronix benefited immensely
from the attractive regulations surrounding employee-stock options. Taiwan’s taxes on employee
stocks were on the basis of its price when issued rather than the current market value; Taiwan
eliminated its capital gains taxes in 1990, therefore no taxes were collected when shares were
sold and returnee engineers who brought capital gains from other jurisdictions were not taxed on
those gains either.118 As a result of these favorable conditions, by the mid 1990s, Taiwan’s
salaries for senior managers were three of four times higher than their equivalent U.S. peers. 119
The State’s tax structure gave tax breaks specifically aimed to facilitate companies offering very
attractive employment offers to top foreign engineers. Under Wu’s leadership Macronix became
a leading world-class producer of flash-memory chips.120 Significantly, this development was
facilitated by Macronix’s partnership with the US- based MNC VLSI Technology Inc, which Wu
had worked for and developed personal and professional relationships.121
While Macronix was one of Taiwan’s first non State or even semi-State firms, the
structure of Taiwan’s system did not attempt to stop the development of competitors to the State
firms. Macronix’s technical and managerial guidance from the predominantly U.S- based ethnic
118 Anna

Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts,148.

119

Ibid., 151.

120

Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, Tiger Technologies, 176.

121

Ibid., 175-176.

Farley 6! 0
Chinese engineer workforce and leadership helped to achieve the firms’ aims to serve a customer
base primarily in the United States, Japan and Europe by quickly recommending the
development of a “targeted a range of niche products needed by next-generation PC’s and
communication products.”122 The choice to focus on a highly specialized niche can be credited
partially to the foreign returnees understanding of industry trends and practices. Additionally, as
discussed in the previous chapter, State incentives greatly encouraged intensive R&D
investments, especially within the HSIP where Macronix located their first VLSI facility. Owing
to the high level of specialization, TSMC and UMC must not have viewed Macronix as a threat
to their business. In fact, TSMC helped the young company remain profitable and efficient by
buying unused fab space and capital equipment that was largely unrelated to Macronix’s
specialized products and also helpful for TSMC’s goal to achieve massive economies of scale.123
Hence Taiwan's semiconductor industry developed so that new firms often specialized and
complemented the activities of other Taiwanese semiconductor industry firms. These local
industry connections proved to be extremely valuable tools for maintaining relevance and
cohesion within the industry.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of these returnee entrepreneurs was their ability
to recognize and understand the dynamics of industry trends and then push the State or private
companies to create a development plan that is forward looking and maximizes returns. As
discussed previously, Dr. Ding Yuan Yang’s work at ERSO greatly impacted the success of
Taiwan's seeding stage of semiconductor development. Dr. Yang's contributions to Taiwan's
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semiconductor development continued through his founding of Winbond Electronics and the
strategical guidance he provided. Dr. Yang's knowledge of the global semiconductor industry,
specifically the trend of vertical disintegration and outsourcing of production, poised his firm
Winbond for success.
Dr. Yang in 2004 wrote an article for a semiconductor manufacturing technology
workshop. The article highlights his in-depth understanding of global business trends and the
opportunities these trends gave to those who recognized them. Dr. Yang understands that
outsourcing in the semiconductor industry is triggered by “the threshold in developing highly
complex SoC products and the solutions escalates quickly…very few companies are selfsufficient in IP and in doing SoC from scratch and within own company…many companies like
to focus on their own competence.” 124 Dr. Yang knew that many global IC design firms were
looking for a reliable partner to outsource the fabrication of their chips. He also knew in order to
become a reliable partner and solve complex problems, his firms technological level must
continuously advance. As a result, Winbond moved quickly to upgrade existing fab capabilities
and built a second fab in 1992 which “incorporated the most advanced submicron technology,
taking Winbond to a prime position in the Taiwan industry.”125 Winbond moved ahead with
ambitious fab expansion plans even despite operating for a time at a negative cash-flow.126 Both
Winbond's high-levels of R&D to net income ratios, as well as continuous fab expansion and
technological upgrading aimed to create a fabrication firm that allowed fabless firms, primarily
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from the United States, to focus on their own objectives and hand off the product with
confidence in the manufacture's technological competencies. Winbond's willingness and ability
to spend large amounts of capital quickly, as well as Winbond's ranks of engineers with foreign
experience in the global IT industry assured foreign producers Winbond would continue to
upgrade fab technologies at the same level as the global cutting edge. Additionally, Winbond's
expansion of fab capabilities assured IC design suppliers that their product would have a quick
time to market, as well as provided evidence for incumbent firms like Toshiba that a techdevelopment deal with Winbond could foster innovation in both for both Toshiba and Winbond.
As a result, Winbond developed both in-house capabilities for technology innovation, as well as
tapped into the innovative and advanced resources of the existing incumbent semiconductor
firms.127
TSMC, Macronix, and Winbond are all successful semiconductor manufacture’s with
technological capabilities close to or at the global cutting edge. Significantly, both TSMC and
Winbond benefited directly from the ERSO and ITRI semiconductor projects. The tech transfers
from the State allowed these firms to enter the market with already sophisticated technologies,
which provided Taiwan's firms the leverage needed to form cross-licensing agreements,
technology development partnerships and tech transfers from foreign MNC’s like Phillips,
Toshiba, and Intel. As Saxenian argues “unlike Japan in the 1980s, Taiwan followed imitation
with differentiation, not with direct competition.”128 Taiwan’s semiconductor industry never
aimed to supplant the existing high-tech infrastructure in the United States, specifically in Silicon
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Valley. In fact, firms like Winbond often collaborated with Taiwanese engineers like Fred Cheng,
who “had worked in Silicon Valley for twenty years but knew Taiwan's technology community
as well because he traveled to headquarters at least ten times a year.”129 Taiwan’s silicon valley
engineers traveled home far more consistently than their Indian and mainland Chinese
counterparts; “only 36 percent of the Taiwanese hadn’t visited Taiwan in the past three years,”
significantly lower than mainland Chinese 56 percent and 48 percent of Indian engineers.”130

Conclusion
Taiwan's returnee entrepreneurs contributed to the development of Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry in a multifaceted manner. During the seeding of Taiwan’s industry,
returnee engineers like Dr. Wen Yuan Pan, Dr. Ding Yuan Yang and others helped shape the
direction of development from within State institutions like the ERSO, ITRI, TAC, and STAG.
These organizations maintained a large foreign membership with experience in large incumbent
technology firms, like Texas Instruments, Intel and Bell Labs. The returnees informed and
advised the decisions of these organizations, which as discussed in Chapter 2, Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry would not have succeeded without. The technical experience, personal
and private networks as well as managerial experience of Taiwan’s returnee population continued
to lead both the large State-origin firms like UMC and TSMC as well as Taiwan’s private
semiconductor firms like Winbond and Macronix. Winbond’s and Macronix's high levels of
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specialization are both a reflection of State policies that encouraged and subsidized R&D
funding, as well as a reflection of returnee entrepreneurs’ knowledge of global business trends,
like outsourcing and the disintegration of vertical production, which rewarded Taiwan’s firms
with high technological levels and specialized products.
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Chapter 4:
Findings from Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry and Potential Future Implications

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, specifically the pureplay-foundry, has achieved a high
level of success both in terms of global market share and technological capabilities. There are
multiple actors in Taiwan that deserve credit for the industry’s remarkable success. The State,
primarily through public research consortia, advisory groups, and favorable tax and financial
incentives, helped to guide the industry in infancy, as well as facilitate the attraction of top
technical talent to Taiwan. Ethnic Chinese returnee entrepreneurs and their personal and
professional networks helped form the recommendations of groups like the TAC and STAG,
which ultimately informed and shaped the decisions of Taiwan’s technocrats during the seeding
stage of Taiwan’s semiconductor development. Additionally, the returnee engineers and
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entrepreneurs continued to aid the development of Taiwan’s industry as more and more small to
medium sized private firms emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s. Without the State’s tailoring
of policy to attract returnee entrepreneurs, and without the returnee’s technical talent, managerial
know-how and work experience it is unlikely Taiwan would have achieved the current level of
semiconductor success.
The structure of Taiwan’s financial system, which reduced patient capital and had
historically encouraged the development of small to medium sized businesses, as well as early
State decisions—like choosing not to develop the project which would eventually become TSMC
within UMC—resulted in less concentration of industry power and revenue within Taiwan’s top
firms. The industry benefited and increased innovation owing to the competitive nature of having
many firms, both large and small, with high-technological capabilities. Each firm had to find a
specialized niche within different semiconductor fabrication types and conduct high levels of
R&D. Oftentimes larger firms like TSMC would facilitate smaller to medium sized firms
specialization as TSMC would buy unused fab space and technology no longer relevant to the
smaller firm, but helpful for a large firm like TSMC for maintaining economies to scale.
The State utilized a wide range of public instruments to attract the technical talent of
Taiwanese-American U.S based engineers and entrepreneurs. The National Science Council’s
Hsinchu Science Based Park provided both the industry infrastructure for physical production,
provided educational infrastructure for the english-speaking children of returnee engineers, and
located the high-tech industry in close proximity to Taiwan’s top engineering universities. The
park facilitated the development of both cross-regional as well as domestic networks of
producers. The HSIP as well as early State efforts initiating cross-regional collaboration, such as
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the METS seminars, aided the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Additionally,
the State’s inclusion of local technical and engineering schools in product R&D allowed different
levels of Taiwanese society to work together to achieve a common goal, technological expansion.
While the State may have been the locus of technological innovation during the seeding
stage of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, key returnees like Dr. Wen Yuan Pan and Dr. Ding
Yuan Yang helped create the State’s infrastructure, and then led the infrastructure—public
research consortia— responsible for advancing Taiwan’s micron technology. Dr. Yang led ERSO
during the upgrading of the transferred RCA micron technology from 7 micron to 1 micron
technology. The connections of the returnees facilitated Taiwan’s initial tech transfers— such as
Dr. Pan’s connections to RCA where he preciously had worked—helping ERSO and Taiwan with
their first steps towards creating their own semiconductor manufacturing technology.
Following the spinoffs of UMC and TSMC, ethnic Chinese U.S- based engineers began
returning to Taiwan in large numbers to join one of Taiwan's new promising semiconductor firms
or found their own. Taiwan’s market was notably more attractive than other similar East Asian
late developers as new small and medium sized firms were common in Taiwan. As a result,
founding a new semiconductor or high-tech firm in Taiwan had significantly lower barriers for
entry than States like Japan and Korea where the majority of IC and high-tech activity occurred
within a few massive conglomerates. Additionally, generous financial tax loop-holes and
subsidizes allowed Taiwan’s semiconductor firms to offer attractive compensation packages,
which often included equity in the company for top-management positions. While these
incentives successfully attracted top foreign talent to Taiwan, one may question how necessary
these incentives were. Bai Xianyong’s short story “Winter Nights” suggest that many returnees
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may have returned to Taiwan in order to give back to their home country and re-establish close
connections with former classmates from childhood and early adulthood. Dr. Pan and Dr. Yang
both returned to aid Taiwan’s infant industry without any guarantee for significant returns. While
not directly attributable to the State’s generous tax loopholes for the top returnee technical talent,
during the period of semiconductor development in Taiwan according to the website statistics
(1980-2018), the Gini coefficient, a measurement of societal inequality, increased from below 30
in the 1980s to 33.8 as of 2018. Despite Taiwan's technological upgrade and significant
economic growth, Taiwan's society is no exception to rising global inequality. Further research
on the relationship between State sponsored tax loopholes and subsides and societal inequality
measurements must be done in order evaluate whether or not the two are directly related.
Almost a majority of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry leadership is at least in part made
up by foreign returnees. Leaders like Miin Wu, Morris Chang, and Dr. Ding Yuan Yang armed
with knowledge of industry trends, technical know-how and managerial experience helped guide
their firms to achieving high levels of specialization in an innovative yet complementary role to
the existing semiconductor industry, primarily in the United States. Without the contributions of
these foreign returnees, finding a niche in the global division of labor might have proven too
challenging for domestic producers without an in-depth knowledge of the existing industry
practices and patterns.
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A Rising Competitor: China’s Push for Semiconductor Dominance
In 2015, China launched an ambitious technological advancement initiative called ‘Made
In China 2025.’ A large part of this initiative is China's attempt to create an entire semiconductor
supply chain—from design to fabrication to testing and assembly—within China's borders.131 As
summarized above, there are many lessons and policies China could borrow from Taiwan’s
successful high-tech late-developer model; however, Taiwan's industry never aimed to become a
direct competitor to the incumbent IC firm’s in the United States. Additionally, Taiwan's
entrepreneurs, engineers and capitalists have already played a significant role in bringing talent,
venture capital and foreign direct investment to China. Many of the same Ethnic Chinese
technology associations which helped facilitate cross-regional connections in Taiwan, like the
Chinese Institute of Engineers and the Chinese American Semiconductor Professional
Association (CASPA), maintain similar services for mainland Chinese engineers.132
China has established multiple high-tech parks similar to the style of Taiwan’s Hsinchu
Science Based Park. For example, the Zhangjiang High-Tech Park in Shanghai is China’s largest
park with significant investments from foreign enterprises. As of 2011, the Park attracted
significant FDI investments, but was not as successful at achieving significant tech-transfers to
Chinese domestic firms as Taiwan.133 There were vast technological gaps between the foreign
and domestic firms within the Park, and as seen in Taiwan, firms with dramatically lower
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technology capabilities are less likely to receive tech transfers and patent cross-license
agreements.
The difference in geopolitical circumstances between China and Taiwan at the times they
pursued tech transfers from abroad are significantly different. Taiwan, as an island nation of only
24 million, never represented a significant challenger to America’s global technological,
political, and economic hegemony. Perhaps, as a result of Taiwan's relatively weak geopolitical
status and lack of capital, Taiwan's industry was forced to seek out a complementary role within
the global semiconductor division of labor rather than pursue the highest value-added segments
of the semiconductor supply chain. American firms making deals with Taiwanese firms in the
90s and early 2000s shifted part of the United State’s high-tech economy, but at the time
outsourcing was a business norm that did not raise questions relating to political issues, like
national security. On the other hand, China is a nation that is increasingly recognized as global
economic leader and a challenger to U.S geopolitical and economic authority. China has large
quantities of capital resources to challenge any incumbent high-value added and capital intensive
industry. For example, China’s National Integrated Circuit Fund recently raised over $29 billion
dollars from different State sources. As a result, a comparison to Taiwan is limited in that the two
operate under different economic conditions and the capital constraints that held back Taiwan do
not exist for China. Further comparative analysis between Taiwan and China’s semiconductor
development models may yield conclusions on the likelihood of China achieving the
technological cutting edge in semiconductors and creating an entire industry ecosystem within
one country.
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